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I. THE TREATY OF NICE MOMENTUM 
The conclusion of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which 
profoundly modified the European Community and created the 
European Union, was followed by various rounds of difficult and 
protracted negotiations among Member States aimed particularly at 
creating substantial institutional changes to the European Union. The 
Intergovernmental Conference (“IGC”) that led to the adoption of the 
Treaty of Nice was indeed very much concerned with the so-called 
“Amsterdam leftovers,”1 namely the weighting of votes in the 
European Council, the extension of qualified majority voting and the 
size of the European Commission. The need to modify the 
institutional framework with the view of the future major enlargement 
by then ten Central European and Mediterranean countries put 
additional pressure on the negotiations. The overall result of the Nice 
                                                                                                                                     
* Judge at the Court of Justice of the European Union and honorary Professor of 
European Law at the Utrecht University. All views expressed are strictly personal. The present 
contribution was finalized in February 2016. The author would like to thank Leonor Vulpe-
Albari for her assistance in finalizing this essay. 
1. The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997. 
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negotiations was rather disappointing,2 with but one bright spot: the 
reform of the European judicature. 
In fact, the alarming growth of the number of cases brought 
before the European courts3 and the increasing length of their 
procedures, combined with the prospect of the enlargement, made 
clear with respect to the judiciary that “something had to be done.” 
The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance anticipated the 
urgent need for changes in 1999 by presenting a discussion paper 
entitled, “The Future of the Judicial System of the European Union.”4 
This initiative was first picked up by the Commission and later by 
Member States, who could apparently relatively easily reach a 
consensus on a number of modifications in the structure and 
operations of the two courts. 
As a result, the Treaty of Nice introduced some important 
innovations, opening the door for possibly far-reaching reforms: the 
introduction of specialized courts, the reallocation of jurisdiction 
between the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance in direct 
actions, and the possibility to confer upon the Court of First Instance 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings in certain types of cases. 
According to a number of declarations made to the Treaty of Nice, the 
Court of Justice and the Commission were supposed to submit 
proposals in order to make these novelties operational and the new 
rules had to be laid down in the Statute of the Court of Justice. For the 
most part this indeed happened. 
However, a number of perhaps less striking, but, for the 
functioning of the Court of Justice, essential changes were decided in 
                                                                                                                                     
2. The Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001 and it called immediately for a “deeper and 
wider debate” about the future of the European Union that should lead to a new IGC. The 
result of a long and cumbersome process was ultimately the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007. 
Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 2001 O.J. C 80/1 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Nice]. 
3. Note that there is some confusion possible as to the denominations. The Treaty on 
European Union in Article 19 provides that the Court of Justice of the European Union shall 
include the Court of Justice, the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance), and 
specialized courts. Up until now, there has been only one specialized court, namely the Civil 
Service Tribunal, but due to a recent reform, this Tribunal will be integrated into the General 
Court. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13 
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. 
4. There exists a wealth of literature, reports, proposals, and other documents relating to 
the Nice changes. See generally ALAN DASHWOOD & ANGUS JOHNSTON, THE FUTURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001). 
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Nice. One of them was that both the Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance can now set their Rules of Procedure subject to 
approval by the Council in a qualified majority vote instead of 
unanimity, as was required in the past. The second important 
modification was the creation of the Grand Chamber. For both courts, 
this meant that most of the cases that would have previously gone to 
the Plenary Court could from then on be referred to the Grand 
Chamber. Indeed, this measure would help the courts cope with their 
ever-increasing caseload. However, and most importantly, with the 
upcoming enlargement in sight, and the fact that there was no serious 
discussion about the principle that each Member State should have a 
judge in each court, it was expected that with twenty-five (and later 
more) judges the plenaries would change from a collegiate Court of 
Justice to a deliberative assembly.5 From a functional point of view, 
this was indeed a bleak prospect. 
In the present contribution, after a glance at the evolutions in the 
past, I will focus on the current functioning of the various formations 
of the Court of Justice with a greater emphasis on the Grand 
Chamber. 
II. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE THROUGH CHAMBERS 
IN RETROSPECT 
Initially, up until 1974, the Rules of Procedure of the Court of 
Justice provided for two chambers of three judges. It was the rule for 
this court to sit as a Full Court, composed at the time of seven 
judges.6 The cases allocated to the chambers only concerned, 
practically speaking, disputes between the European institutions and 
their civil servants. In 1974, the situation started to change. First, the 
possibility to adjudicate on certain matters in a chamber of five judges 
was created, with two chambers of three judges and two chambers of 
five judges being prescribed in the Rules of Procedure. In 1979, this 
provision was abolished and the Court of Justice was free to regulate 
the number of chambers in accordance with its needs. In a subsequent 
                                                                                                                                     
5. See P.J.G. Kapteyn, Reflections on the Future of the Judicial System of the European 
Union After Nice, 20 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 173, 186 (2001) (citing Report of the Court of Justice on 
Certain Aspects of the Application of the Treaty on European Union, WKLY. BULL. ON THE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE CT. AND THE CT. OF FIRST INSTANCE No. 15/95, May 24, 1995, at 18). 
6. This was the rule before the accession of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark on January 1, 
1973. The number of judges in the European Court of Justice has gradually increased from 
seven at the time of its creation in 1952 to twenty-eight now. 
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round of modifications, the possibility to form chambers of three, 
five, and seven judges was created.7 
Parallel to this, the categories of cases that could be dealt with in 
chambers were gradually extended. In the end, any type of case could 
be assigned to a chamber “in so far as the difficulty or importance of 
the case or particular circumstances are not such as to require that the 
Court decide it in plenary session.”8 However, a Member State or 
Community institution that was a party to a case could always 
demand that the case be heard by the Plenary Court.9 
Finally, another practice developed over time: while the Court of 
Justice was still regularly sitting in plenary session, a distinction was 
made between the “petit plenum” and the “grand plenum.” Just before 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice changes, this meant that the 
plenum consisted either of eleven or all fifteen judges, respectively.10 
After the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice on February 1, 
2003, the situation was as follows: a plenary session of all judges was 
obligatory in a limited number of cases;11 the Grand Chamber 
consisted initially of eleven judges, but, after the enlargement in May 
2004, the number increased to thirteen judges. Furthermore, a major 
change brought by the Treaty of Nice was the election of the 
presidents of the five judge chambers for periods of three years.12 In 
2003, there were two such chambers, whereas their number 
eventually increased to five. The same evolution took place regarding 
the number of three-judge chambers. 
The extension to five chambers of five judges and five chambers 
of three judges took place in 2012. In fact, a chamber of three is 
closely associated to a chamber of five; it is composed of the judges 
                                                                                                                                     
7.  Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic 
of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden, and the Adjustments to the Treaties on which the 
European Union is Founded art. 18, 1994 O.J. C 241/08, at 25, as amended by Commission 
Decision No. 95/1/EC (Euratom) art. 2, 1995 O.J. L 1/5, and Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 165, 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37 [hereinafter EC 
Treaty]. 
8.  Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities art. 95, 1991 
O.J. L 176, as amended by 2011 O.J. L 162.  
9. EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 165, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 60.  
10. See Kapteyn, supra note 5. 
11. Protocol (No. 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union art. 16, 
2010 O.J. C 83/210, at 213 [hereinafter Statute of the Court of Justice]. 
12. Before that time, those presidents were elected for a period of one year according to 
a tour de role system. This situation still exists for the presidents of the chambers of three 
judges. 
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of a chamber of five, but it does not include the president of that 
chamber. The president of the chamber of three sits in all the cases 
and the other three judges rotate.13 The Court of Justice decides which 
judges shall be attached to the various chambers. The composition of 
the chambers is published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union. 
Also, the Grand Chamber saw a change in 2012 with the new 
Rules of Procedure; the number of judges sitting in the Grand 
Chamber was extended to fifteen. According to Article 27 of the 
Rules of Procedure, the President, the Vice-President,14 and the 
reporting judge of the Court—the so-called Judge-Rapporteur—sit 
automatically in the Grand Chamber. Furthermore, three of the five 
presidents of the chambers of five and nine other judges are chosen by 
a system of rotation on the basis of a list drawn up for this purpose 
and published in the Official Journal of the European Union. If either 
the President or the Vice-President is the Judge-Rapporteur, a tenth 
judge is assigned to the Grand Chamber. In brief, the composition of 
the Grand Chamber differs per case. 
New in relation to the regime before the new Rules of Procedure 
of 2012 is the participation of the Vice-President, a function that was 
also created in 2012; the participation of a part of the presidents of 
chambers instead of all of them;15 and a more frequent participation of 
other judges. This is an important aspect as it contributes to a better 
representation of all of the legal systems that are brought together 
within the Court of Justice, and better reflects the principle of equality 
between judges.16 
Before concluding this Section, two other chambers should be 
mentioned: the PPU Chamber and the Reviewing Chamber. These 
are, in fact, existing chambers of five judges, which are designated for 
a period of one year to handle either a preliminary reference in an 
                                                                                                                                     
13. For the composition of chambers, see Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice art. 
28, 2012 O.J. L 265, as amended by 2013 O.J. L 173, at 19 [hereinafter Rules of Procedure]. 
14. The President and Vice-President of the Court and the presidents of the chambers of 
five are elected by their colleague judges for a period of three years. The presidents of the 
chambers of three change each year. In practice, a system of rotation is applied to the latter 
chambers. 
15. The presidents of the chambers of five were ex officio members of the Grand 
Chamber. 
16. Before the extension of the Grand Chamber, “ordinary judges” sat in approximately 
one third of the cases. After the changes, this number increased to half. 
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urgent procedure or a review proposal made by the First Advocate 
General, respectively. 
The urgent preliminary procedure or the “PPU” (procédure 
préjudicielle d’urgence) was put in place in 2008 in order to enable 
the Court of Justice to respond quickly to particularly urgent cases.17 
The PPU applies only in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(“AFSJ”).18 As of March 1, 2008, a reference for a preliminary ruling 
that raises one or more questions concerning the AFSJ may, at the 
request of a national court or tribunal (or, exceptionally, of the Court 
of Justice’s own motion) be dealt with by way of the PPU. 
In these urgent procedures fundamental rights are often at stake, 
such as the right to liberty, the right to life, the prohibition of inhuman 
or degrading treatment, the rights of the child, the right to family life, 
and the right to effective judicial protection. To date, only two 
scenarios have been considered by the Court of Justice as being of 
such urgency as to justify the application of the PPU.19 The first 
scenario concerns a person in custody, detention, or otherwise 
deprived of his liberty and the answer to the question referred is 
decisive to the assessment of that person’s legal situation.20 The 
second situation relates to a risk of serious and potentially irreparable 
                                                                                                                                     
17. Rules of Procedure, supra note 13, arts. 107-14, at 45. An explicit reference in 
Article 267 of TFEU was inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon due to the need of the Court of 
Justice to give its ruling with minimum delay in cases concerning a person held in custody. See 
Statute of the Court of Justice, supra note 11, art. 23a, 2010 O.J. C 83, at 216. 
18. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts. 
67-89, 2012 O.J. C 326/47 [hereinafter TFEU] (concerning asylum, immigration, and judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters). 
19. See EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE USE OF THE URGENT 
PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE, 2008; see also 
Recommendations to National Courts and Tribunals in Relation to the Initiation of Preliminary 
Ruling Proceedings, 2012 O.J. C 338/1, at 37-40.  
20. See generally M.G. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, Case C-383/13, 
2013, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=140861&pageIndex=0
&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=685758; accord Zoran Spasic, Case 
C-129/14, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152981
&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=685809; Mahdi v. 
Administrativen sad Sofia-grad, Case C-146/14, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=153314&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&
occ=first&part=1&cid=685882; Minister of Justice and Equality v. Francis Lanigan, Case C-
237/15, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165908&
pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=685989. 
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harm to a parent/child relationship or some other psychological 
damage.21 
As mentioned above, the PPU Chamber is a chamber of five 
judges that is designated as such every judicial year. However, this 
chamber may also decide to sit in a formation of three judges or may 
request the Court of Justice to assign the case to a greater formation, 
usually the Grand Chamber.22  
Between 2010 and 2014, approximately half of the applications 
for PPU were granted, with approximately three to four requests for 
PPU being granted annually.23 While the average duration of a 
“normal” preliminary ruling case amounted to fifteen months in 2014, 
the average duration of a PPU is between two and two-and-a-half 
months today. 
The Reviewing Chamber, created by the new Rules of Procedure 
of 2012, is entrusted with the review procedure. The reason for this 
procedure is that the decisions of the General Court cannot generally 
be appealed before the Court of Justice. However, in exceptional 
cases, upon the proposal of the First Advocate General, the Court of 
Justice may nevertheless review a decision where there is a “serious 
risk that the unity or consistency” of European Union law is being 
affected.24 
The Reviewing Chamber considers the proposal of the First 
Advocate General to launch the review procedure and decides 
whether the procedure should be initiated or not.25 To date, the review 
                                                                                                                                     
21. See generally Jasna Detiček, v. Maurizio Sgueglia, Case C-403/09, [2009] E.C.R. I-
12, ¶ 193; P v. Q, Case C-455/15, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=171789&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=
686035. 
22. Rules of Procedure, supra note 13, art. 113, at 47; see generally Said Shamilovich 
Kadzoev (Huchbarov), Case C-357/09, [2009] E.C.R. I-11, ¶ 189; Minister for Justice and 
Equality v. Lanigan, Case C-237/15, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=165908&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1097390.  
23. See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at table 
16. During the period of 2010 to 2014, there were thirty-three applications, of which seventeen 
were granted. 
24. TFEU, supra note 18, art. 256(2), 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 567; see also TEU post-
Lisbon, supra note 3, art. 62, 2012 O.J. C 326/13, at 210. A similar provision is included for 
preliminary references in Article 256(3) of TFEU. However, this article will only apply when 
the General Court would be given jurisdiction in preliminary cases, which is not the case to 
date. 
25. The circumstances that may justify such a review have been considered. See 
generally M. v. European Medicines Agency (EMA), Case C-197/09, [2009] E.C.R. I-12, ¶ 
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procedure has been pursued in only a few cases, which corresponds to 
its exceptional nature. Like the PPU Chamber, the Reviewing 
Chamber may request the Court of Justice to assign the case to a 
formation composed of a greater number of judges.26 
III. THE ATTRIBUTION OF CASES TO CHAMBERS 
There are only a few written rules that prescribe the attribution 
of a case to a specific formation. 
As far as the Full Court is concerned, the Statute of the Court of 
Justice lists a number of cases that must be heard by the Plenary 
Court. These include, inter alia, the dismissal of the European 
Ombudsman and the compulsory retirement of a member of the 
European Commission in breach of his or her obligations.27 
Furthermore, the Court of Justice may decide to refer a case to the 
Full Court when it considers that the case before it is of exceptional 
importance.28 Two recent examples of cases of such exceptional 
importance that were decided by the Full Court are: (1) the Pringle 
case, which concerned the compatibility of the “European Stability 
Mechanism” with the requirements of European Union law; and (2) 
Opinion 2/13 on the accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.29 
The Court of Justice sits in a Grand Chamber when a Member 
State or an institution of the European Union that is party to the 
proceedings so requests, or when, according to the Court, the case is 
important or difficult.30 The criteria applied are not totally fixed and 
                                                                                                                                     
033; Jaramillo v. European Investment Bank (EIB), Case C-334/12, 2013 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=134378&pageIndex
=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686139; Commission v. Strack, 
Case C-579/12, 2013, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid
=141785&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686197. 
26. Rules of Procedure, supra note 13, art. 195(5), at 74. 
27.  See generally Commission v. Cresson, Case C-432/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-6387. 
28. Statute of the Court of Justice, supra note 11, art. 16, 2001 O.J. C 83, at 213; Rules 
of Procedure, supra note 13, art. 60(2), at 31-32. 
29. Pringle v. Gov’t of Ireland, Ireland, and the Att’y General, Case C-370/12, 2012,  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=130561&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686299; Opinion 2/13, Article 218(11) 
TFEU, 2014 (pending case). 
30. Statute of the Court of Justice, supra note 11, art. 16(2), 2001 O.J. C 83, at 213; 
Rules of Procedure, supra note 13, art. 60(1), at 31. 
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the Court of Justice has considerable flexibility in deciding whether a 
case should be referred to the Grand Chamber. Various aspects may 
be taken into consideration by the Court of Justice, for instance, 
whether the questions addressed are entirely new and new guiding 
principles must be developed, whether there seems to be a problem of 
coherence in the case law, or when the court may consider departing 
from its precedents. 
According to Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure, the Court of 
Justice shall assign to a chamber of five and a chamber of three any 
case brought before it in so far as the difficulty or importance of the 
case or particular circumstances are not such as to require that it 
should be assigned to the Grand Chamber. 
Chambers of three judges decide “routine” cases: those that do 
not raise new questions or, if they do, cases where such questions are 
relatively easy to deal with. In the latter cases, an opinion of the 
Advocate General will often be requested. Most of the cases decided 
by a chamber of three are trademark appeals and, increasingly, other 
appeals against decisions of the General Court, non- or hardly 
contested infringement proceedings against Member States and 
preliminary references in the area of custom classification, agriculture 
or value-added tax (“VAT”). Interestingly, there may often be a 
choice between a chamber of three judges or the Grand Chamber, 
depending on whether precedent must be followed or a change to the 
jurisprudence could be under consideration. 
Chambers of five judges are the “normal” formation. These 
chambers decide cases that are not entirely straightforward and in 
which principles developed by the Grand Chamber have to be 
applied. But, as is often the case, this application requires further 
interpretation and in some respects even a further development of the 
law. To put it in negative terms, the cases before a chamber of five 
judges are, on one hand, too difficult or sensitive due to the legal 
issues raised for a chamber of three but, on the other hand, not 
important and difficult enough for the Grand Chamber. The Léger 
case can be mentioned as an example.31 This case concerned the 
justification of a permanent prohibition banning blood donations from 
men who have had sexual relations with other men. Another example 
                                                                                                                                     
31. Léger v. Ministre des Affaires Sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des Femmes, 
Établissement Français du Sang, Case C-528/13, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=164021&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686389.  
1282 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1273 
is the CDC case, which concerned the question of which court victims 
of unlawful cartels may claim compensation before.32 
The actual choice of chambers is decided in the General 
Meeting, a weekly meeting that includes all of the judges and 
Advocates General. The Judge-Rapporteur, a judge designated as 
such by the President of the Court, submits to the General Meeting a 
so-called preliminary report on a particular case.33 In this report, 
which is prepared in cooperation with the responsible Advocate 
General, a reasoned proposal is made concerning, inter alia, what 
formation the case should be attributed. 
A designated chamber may refer a case back to the Court of 
Justice at any stage of the proceedings in order to have the case 
reassigned to a formation composed of a greater number of judges.34 
This happened recently in the PFE case.35 The case, initially pending 
before the Fifth Chamber, was reassigned to the Grand Chamber. The 
latter chamber has since reopened the oral procedure and invited 
“interested persons” (referred to in Article 23 of the Statute of the 
Court of Justice36) to give their views on the key question in the case, 
namely whether the concept of “court or tribunal” within the meaning 
of Article 267 of the TFEU should be interpreted according to a 
functional or organizational approach.37 
                                                                                                                                     
32. Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) Hydrogen Peroxide SA v. Akzo Novel NV et al., Case 
C-352/13, 2015,  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=164350&
pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=686471 . 
33. Rules of Procedure, supra note 13, art. 59, at 31. 
34. Id. art. 60(3), at 32. 
35. Puligienica Facility Esco SpA (PFE)  v. Airgest SpA, Case C-689/13, 2016,  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=175548&pageIndex=
0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=678513. 
36. These interested persons are the parties, Member States, the Commission, and the 
institution, body, office, or agency of the European Union that adopted the act of which the 
validity or interpretation is in dispute. Statue of the Court of Justice, supra note 11, art. 23, at 
213. 
37. See generally Puligienica Facility Esco (PFE) v. SpA,  Order of the Court, Case C-
689/13, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&
pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=LST&docid=166224&occ=first&cid=201873. Advocate 
General Wathelet delivered his second opinion in Additional Opinion of Advocate General 
Wathelet, Puligienica Facility Esco SpA (PFE), C-689/13. 
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IV. THE VARIOUS CHAMBERS IN PRACTICE 
A brief look at the statistics of the Court of Justice shows that 
since 2005, the number of cases before the Grand Chamber has 
oscillated between 41 in 2009 and 71 in 2010.38 The average over the 
period of 2005 to 2014 is 55 cases per year. 
The statistics over the last five years are as follows:  
As aforementioned the relative numbers show that the most 
common formation is a chamber of five judges, hearing 
approximately 55 percent of all cases. Chambers of three judges 
follow with some 33 percent, and the Grand Chamber, as the bench 
hearing the case, is limited to approximately 10 percent of cases on 
average.39 The latter percentage may seem relatively low, especially 
when compared to the situation as it existed before the Treaty of Nice. 
Although the number of cases decided by the plenary session has 
consistently fallen, still some 30 percent of the cases were heard by 
the Full Court.40 However, the restrained use of the Grand Chamber 
corresponds with the endeavor to call upon this formation only in 
                                                                                                                                     
38. Statistics of Judicial Activity, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7032/. 
The numbers refer to completed cases. Years 2003 and 2004 do not give a clear picture since 
the small plenary and the Full Court of the “previous regime” are still included. The great 
difference between 2009 and 2010 is due, in part, to the somewhat arbitrary cut-off date for 
statistics. 
39. The percentages over the last five years (chamber of five, chamber of three, Grand 
Chamber) are: 2010: 58.06% - 26.62% - 14.31%; 2011: 55.15% - 32.54% - 11.40%; 2012: 
54.11% - 34.42% - 8.99%; 2013: 59.03% - 31.77% - 8.39%; 2014: 54.49% - 36.54% - 8.68%. 
40. See Kapteyn, supra note 5, at 187. During the years before Nice, more than 70% of 
the judgements or other decisions emanated from chambers. Note, however, that there was the 
“petit plenum” and the “grand plenum.” 
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fundamental cases where decisions involving basic principles of 
European Union law must be made. 
The subject matter concerned in the cases heard by the Grand 
Chamber vary considerably. For example, some topics in recent case 
law include inter-institutional litigation cases in which the European 
institutions seek a clear delimitation of their respective powers in the 
various areas of European Union law,41 cases on the scope of 
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,42 cases dealing with 
the interpretation of the complex and sensitive rules of the Common 
European Asylum System,43 effective judicial protection of persons 
against whom restrictive measures has been taken, like the freezing of 
funds and economic resources and in particular the use of (secret) 
evidence against those persons,44 protection of private life and 
                                                                                                                                     
41. See generally Parliament and Commission v. Council, Joined Cases C-132–136/14, 
2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=172988&pageIndex=0
&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=681201; Commission v. Parliament 
and Council, Case C-88/14, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&
docid=165925&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=682365
; Council v. Commission, Case C-73/14, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=172255&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&
dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=682493; Commission v. Council, Case C-425/13, 2015, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165904&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=682660; Council v. Commission, Case 
C-409/13,  2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=163659&
pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=682556. 
42. See generally Aklagaren v. Fransson, Case C-617/10, 2013, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0617&from=EN; Melloni v. 
Fiscal, Case C-399/11, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF
/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0399&from=EN. 
43. See generally N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Joined Cases C-411/10 and 
C-493/10, 2011, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
62010CJ0411&from=EN; Centre Public d'Action Sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve v. 
Moussa Abdida, Case C-562/13, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=160943&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid
=683324; M’Bodj v. Belge, Case C-542/13, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=160947&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&
occ=first&part=1&cid=330710; Achughbabian v. du Val-de-Marne, Case C-329/11, 2011, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62011CJ0329; K v. 
Bundesasylamt,  Case C-245/11, 2012, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=129325&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1
096173. 
44. See generally Commission v. Kadi, Joined Cases C-584, 593, 595/10 P, 2013, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=139745&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1455841; Anbouba v. Council, Case C-
630/13 P, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=161242
&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1456941; see also ZZ 
v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-300/11, 2013, http://curia.europa.eu/
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personal data protection,45 free movement of European Union citizens 
and their entitlements to social benefits,46 liability of the Court of 
Justice for the damage caused by the failure of the General Court to 
adjudicate within a reasonable time,47 taxation and free movement of 
capital or freedom of establishment cases,48 various aspects of 
environmental law,49 cooperation in criminal matters and in particular 
cases on the European arrest warrant,50 some cases on competition 
                                                                                                                                     
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=137981&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&di
r=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1457372. 
45. See generally Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Case C-
131/12, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=
9ea7d2dc30d502305b17936e4df9978eb958439df01d.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuSbx90?text
=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid
=919770; Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Case C-362/14, 2015, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=169195&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=921248; Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. 
Minister for Communications, Marine, and Natural Resources, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-
594/12, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=150642&
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1455231. 
46. See generally Dano v. Jobcenter Leipzig, Case C-333/13, 2014, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=159442&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=36613; Jobcenter Berlin Neukölln v. 
Alimanovic, Case C-67/14, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=167661&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=36806.  
47. See generally Groupe Gascogne SA v. Commission, Case C-58/12 P, 2013, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=144942&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=37061. 
48. See generally Finanzamt Dortmund-Unna v. Grünewald, Case C-559/13, 2015, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=162422&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=227032; Nordea Bank Danmark A/S v. 
Skatteministeriet, Case C-48/13, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text
=&docid=155108&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2276
02; Felixstowe Dock and Ry. Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue & 
Customs, Case C-80/12, 2014, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=150181&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=
228080. 
49. See generally Council v. Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Joined Cases C-404–405/12 P, 
2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=161323&pageIndex
=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1453003; Fish Legal v. Info 
Commissioner, Case C-279/12, 2013, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=145904&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=14517
89; Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland eV v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case 
C-461/13, 2015, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165446&
pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1452455. 
50. See generally Minister for Justice and Equality v. Lanigan, Case C-237/15, 2015,  
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62015CJ0237&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=; 
Curtea de Apel Constanta v. Radu, Case C-396/11, 2013, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0396&from=EN; Generalstaatsanwaltschaft 
Bremen v. Aranyosi, Case C-404/15 (pending case).  
1286 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1273 
law,51 and so on. Strikingly, compared to the earlier years of what was 
then European Community law, current cases frequently concern the 
interpretation of secondary European Union law and are rather sector-
specific. Such cases often do not require the intervention of the Grand 
Chamber and are adjudicated by a chamber of five or even three 
judges. 
Apart from deciding fundamental cases, the Grand Chamber, as 
briefly mentioned above, also has an important role in guarding the 
consistency of the Court of Justice’s case law. When most of the 
cases are decided in chambers, there is indeed an increased risk of 
inconsistencies between chamber judgements or ambiguity in certain 
areas of jurisprudence. If one of those scenarios occurs, the Grand 
Chamber may be called upon to provide guidance. All of this is in 
addition to the other mechanisms that should guarantee the 
consistency of the case law. First of all, while the composition of the 
Grand Chamber differs per case, the President and Vice-President are 
always part of the formation, together with three of the five presidents 
of the chambers of five. Second, the General Meeting is also 
important for maintaining case law consistency. At this meeting, as 
mentioned above, the preliminary reports in the cases currently 
pending before the Court of Justice are submitted. Through these 
reports all the members of the Court of Justice are made aware of 
potential parallel cases pending in other chambers. Third, the 
Advocate General may warn of any inconsistencies in the case law. 
Fourth, a measure specifically intended by the Treaty of Nice to 
enhance consistency in the case law is the election of the president of 
the chambers of five judges for three years, the practical result of 
which is that chambers of five judges (and of three judges) usually 
operate with the same judges during a period of at least three years. 
Finally, in their preliminary examination of the cases, the research 
and documentation service collaborates with the registry to spot 
similar pending or recently-decided cases of the Court of Justice. 
An often recurring question is whether there is, or should be, 
specialization of the chambers at the Court of Justice. There is not, as 
such, an official specialization between the chambers. This is wise. 
Developing case law is a collective responsibility of the whole Court, 
                                                                                                                                     
51. See generally Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Schenker & Co., Case C-681/11, 2013,  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0681&from=EN; 
Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis NV, Case C-199/11, 2012, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0199&from=EN. 
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where the contribution of the legal systems brought together within 
the Court is important. Laying the judicial decisions in certain areas in 
the hands of a limited number of judges is at odds with this idea. To 
this, one may add that even technical or sector-specific cases often 
touch upon horizontal issues or even foundational principles of 
European Union law. Specialization in chambers could potentially 
harm harmonious development and application of these horizontal 
aspects. That being said, one must admit that something akin to a 
certain degree of specialization may occur due to the way in which 
cases are assigned to a Judge-Rapporteur. The President designates 
the Judge-Rapporteur. The Judge-Rapporteur, together with an 
Advocate General,52 bears the primary responsibility for the case and 
he or she “holds the pen” during the whole procedure. When 
designating the Judge-Rapporteur, the President will usually take into 
account whether a certain judge has been already dealing with a 
certain matter and has profoundly familiarized him or herself with the 
area of European Union law concerned. For reasons of efficiency, this 
judge will receive, during a certain period of time, cases that are 
similar. Since a judge is assigned for a certain period of time—at least 
for three years—to one of the chambers of five or three judges, that 
chamber will slightly and temporarily specialize as well. 
Finally, the introduction of the Grand Chamber and the 
chambers of five and three judges in the wake of the Treaty of Nice 
have considerably contributed to the ability of the Court of Justice to 
face an ever increasing case load and deal with cases within a 
reasonable time limit.53 Again, the statistics are telling. Since 2004, 
the duration of the proceedings, in particular the preliminary ruling 
proceedings, has decreased, while the number of incoming cases has 
increased. This is due in part to a number of other organizational 
measures taken by the Court of Justice. However, the use of chambers 
plays an important part as well. The numbers of the last few years are 
illustrative. While in 2013 and 2014 the Court of Justice decided 
some hundred more cases than in 2012, the length of the proceedings 
hardly changed. For a great part this is thanks to the creation of a fifth 
chamber of five judges and a tenth chamber of three judges in 2012. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
52. The First Advocate General designates the responsible Advocate General. Rules of 
Procedure, supra note 13, art. 16, at 14-15.  
53. Notably, many other practical and organizational measures have been taken to make 
this possible. 
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To put it briefly, the introduction of the Grand Chamber and the 
functioning of the other chambers as put in place after the Treaty of 
Nice can be considered a success. These changes, perhaps discreet for 
the outside world, have made it possible to deliberate in a meaningful 
way within a judicial body of twenty-eight judges and to increase the 
efficiency of the Court of Justice, which has to cope with an ever-
increasing workload. There exists a constantly upward trend in the 
number of references for preliminary rulings and, more recently, in 
appeals against the rulings of the General Court. The envisaged 
extension of the General Court54 is likely to reinforce this trend. The 
question is indeed what this will imply for the functioning of the 
Court of Justice. No doubt new measures will be necessary, starting 
with practical and organizational measures. However, in the long run, 
probably only more robust changes to the judicial structure of the 
European Union will help address the eternal dilemma of every 
judicial branch, namely how to safeguard a timely and efficient 
delivery of justice without sacrificing the quality of rulings and unity 
of the law. 
                                                                                                                                     
54. See Council Regulation 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Protocol No. 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2015 
O.J. L 341/14; see also David Hadroušek, Solving the European Union’s General Court, 40 
EUR. L. REV. 188, [pin cite] (2015); Cecelia Kye, A Quagmire of Delays at the European 
General Court: Any Escape?, 22 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 453, 455-57 (2015). 
